Afghan Intellectuals' Global Community

The biggest obstacle to the security in Afghanistan is corruption, favoritism, and unqualified officials in the Afghan government.

By Jamil Dani

SOURCE: The Guardian

“This kind of corruption indirectly exacerbates Afghanistan’s conflict. Since corruption consistently goes unpunished, Afghans feel betrayed by their leaders – and insurgents have in turn fed off this widespread sense of disappointment. The enemy sees a vacuum to fill. Just last week, Taliban insurgents attacked Kunduz – the last stronghold lost by the Taliban in 2001. This is the second time in two months that the Taliban have attacked Kunduz – they first briefly seized it last August.

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Before Malala



“The fact that all this history surprises us as much as it does is a measure of how far we have allowed the extremists to dominate our images of what it means to be a Muslim in general, and Pashtun in particular. It is certainly true that both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have been lacerated by violent extremism and misogyny — ever since the United States, the Saudis and Pakistan’s intelligence agency armed religious extremists in Peshawar in the 1980s to take on the Soviet Union. But it should be remembered that the main resistance to extremism has been the local Pashtuns themselves.”

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To Break the Stalemate in Afghanistan, America Must Break Pakistan’s Pathologies



“Pakistani strategic culture stems from pathological geopolitics infused with a Salafi-Deobandi jihadist ideology, suffused by paranoia and neurosis.  The principal but not exclusive reason that Afghanistan has seen discernibly improved quality and quantity in its forces as well as fighting capacity, yet continues to face a strategic stalemate, is the Pakistani security elites’ malign strategic calculus.  The Taliban would have been a marginal nuisance, without the full support that Pakistan’s security establishment bestowed to pursue Pakistan’s imaginary notion of strategic depth on its western flank by asserting control over Afghanistan through its zealous proxies”.

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An Interview with General (ret) Stanley McChrystal

By Michael Miklaucic | PRISM Volume 6, No 3 | December 07, 2016

Source: Center for Complex Operations

"... In Afghanistan in 2001 we went in on obviously very short notice in response to the attacks on September 11th. There was a rich history in Afghanistan—in which the United States had been deeply involved—and yet we didn’t really go to school on that. Not only did we not understand the culture of Afghanistan, but we did not really understand the players in Afghanistan—the former warlords, the leaders that had fought against the Soviets—who had become such important players once the Taliban regime was defeated. Although we understood in very broad strokes the Pakistani and Iranian positions, we didn’t understand the nuances; we didn’t understand the long-existing issues and concerns that they have. So as we started to execute a policy that on a superficial level seemed very logical, we ran into pressures, forces, interests, and equities of people that are, I won’t say immovable, but very difficult to move. The entire western world was very surprised by that or at least unprepared to deal with it. Afghanistan in particular was a case of finding a problem of much greater complexity, much deeper roots, and much more difficult issues than we appreciated."

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Pashtuns caught in another proxy war

By Nushin Arbabzadah

Source: The Gardian

"The Taleban are not the creation of Pashtun society, but the creation of the Pakistan army," said Afsandyar Wali, the head of the ANP. "Pashtuns stand united for peace, but the fire of war is burning our land and we have to find the means to extinguish it. We are caught in the middle of warmongers, extremists and militants," he added.

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The 1980s mujahideen, the Taliban and the shifting idea of jihad

By Nushin Arbabzadah

Source: The Gardian

"28 April marks the 19th anniversary of the mujahideen's victory over the Red Army forces in Afghanistan. The original mujahideen of the 1980s and today's Taliban may use the same language of holy war, but their understanding of jihad is worlds apart. The key difference between the original mujahideen and the Taliban is that the former waged a traditional type of jihad. In a traditional jihad, if waged locally, a contest over control of resources takes place between rival strongmen who each run their own private armies. In this scenario, the ultimate legitimacy to rule draws upon military strength, but the contest itself is called jihad simply because Islam is the sole language of political legitimacy."

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Meeting with Majeed Qarar, Cultural Attache at the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington DC.

Afghan intellectuals' Global Community was honored to meet Mr. Majeed Qarar and present him a certificate of appreciation for his hard work, dedication and patriotism. Auguest 22, 2018

Honoring our hero and remembering the Victims of Terrorism